Source: D. Bankier, The German and the Final Solution (Oxford, 1992), pp.14-27.
Unlike dictatorships of traditional elites which sought to neutralise the masses by preventing them from taking an active part in political life, the Nazi regime attempted to create a situation in which the public would be permanently mobilised.
Many researchers attribute the broad consensus behind the Third Reich to the readiness of almost all strata of the population to participate in the new order. They argue that a religious devotion gripped the masses, which spontaneously and willingly followed the party's lead. The picture which emerges is one of unequivocal support for the Nazi system and its political culture by most of the German public - a picture closely matching the one painted by Goebbels' propaganda media, and in keeping with what the regime hoped to achieve, rather than with any historical reality. In contrast to this idealised state of affairs, our sources reveal that, from as early as summer 1934, the euphoria, which had accompanied the party's rise and accession to power was steadily on the wane.
The Limits of Mass Mobilisation
Once the party was entrenched in power, public attitudes were characterised not by mass revolutionary fervour, but by a growing distaste for political action, manifested in unwillingness to participate in mass-mobilisation campaigns, and reluctance to support the rallies, parades and meetings organised by, or on behalf of, the party. Indeed, there was a marked tendency to political indifference, and official propaganda was often met with passive hostility. The Nazis' purpose in holding rallies and meetings was to get rational individuals to succumb to the spell of cliches and stereotyped slogans and undergo an emotional experience of collective awakening. It seems that this form of indoctrination often fell short of its target 1 . Only a year after the party came to power, sizeable sectors of the population began to criticise the mass mobilisations, though the criticisms were phrased with utmost caution for fear of reprisals. Early signs of the dwindling influence of Nazi propaganda can be traced in the April 1934 report of the district governor in Regensburg. Among other things, he pointed out that 'In the county of Deggendorf, the peasants complain about too many festive, political parades and too much canvassing; this discontent is, however, expressed very cautiously.' 2 Evidence from all over the Reich shows that little by little this disposition became a widespread phenomenon.
At first the surveys merely mention this new trend in a few casual sentences without any attempt at appraisal or interpretation, because the reporter regarded it as insignificant and transient. However, by summer of 1935 it had become so strong that many observers thought that the broad base of support for the regime might be cracking. From August 1934 the central authorities started to receive reports from all areas of the Reich noting increasing apathy and withdrawal from political life. The governor of the Aachen district, for instance, detected, 'more and more indifference... as far as political life is concerned.' 3 The optimistic and self-satisfied accounts that local party bosses submitted to the leadership, in order to consolidate their own positions, were contradicted by more objective surveys. In October the Duesseldorf Gestapo wrote in no uncertain terms of deep-seated apathy, political lethargy and lack of faith. Bowed down by pessimism the public tacitly rejected the daily press, particularly the party organs. The same Gestapo station even cautioned the decision-makers not to misinterpret the state of affairs in the Reich:
Even though the external image is one of quiet and equanimity, one cannot obtain an objective appreciation of the prevailing public mood when one realises that the undercurrents mentioned are gaining in importance. The indifferent and often apathetic disposition of broad sectors of the population points definitely in this direction 4 .
In Muenster the local Gestapo similarly noted that 'The true mood of the population is reflected in the passivity of great parts of the public towards the movement's activities. Only because of fear of reprisals has this attitude remained submerged.' 5 The Aachen Gestapo further warned that the rosy accounts purveyed at the national convention of party leaders in Munich should not be taken too seriously. Although the convention reported impressive achievements and an extraordinary rise in party popularity, the reality was rather different 6 . A central reason for the public's apathy was the numbing effect of too much propaganda. There is little doubt that, after the Nazis had gained power and begun to consolidate their position, there were two opposing trends. Like other revolutionary movements, which have succeeded in winning power, Nazism experienced a clash between the impulse towards permanent revolution and the forces of institutionalisation. The Nazi ideal was itself a contradiction in terms: political stability achieved through, and expressed in, constant action. All the festivals and parades were part of an attempt to regulate the pace of life of the German nation, to overcome crises by diverting people and at the same time to maintain a high profile for the party. Dynamism was at the heart of Nazism, inherent in both its revolutionary nature and its vitalist philosophy, which it shared with all other fascist movements. Propaganda had an essential part to play here, both through indoctrination and through inculcating a heightened sense of political consciousness. Hitler himself pointed this out when he decided to establish a propaganda ministry: 'There will now have to be a large-scale campaign of propaganda and information in order that no political lethargy should set in.' 7 The bulk of the population sought to institutionalise the achievements of the revolution and prevent dynamism from becoming the basis of day-to-day life. The party leadership, by contrast, sought constantly to reactivate the masses, to prevent ideological ossification and a loss of fervour. To this end it attempted to detach people from their traditional cultures and to prevent a simple (return to normal'. The result was the opposite of the one intended: people became satiated with political activity and lost interest.
This was the background to the report of the Hanover Gestapo in February 1935, which commented that participation in party assemblies was declining everywhere owing to the abundance of such mass gatherings 8 . The governor of the Minden district had a similar tale to tell. Illustrating developments in his region, he mentioned that an order to assemble for a rally had met with an apathetic response. This he thought understandable, considering the fatigue engendered by years of consciousness-raising 9 .
It would be a mistake to assume that these attitudes were typical only of areas in which Nazism was less firmly entrenched. William S. Allen, using different evidence, arrived at similar conclusions: the marches, flag-waving and rallies induced and coexisted with public weariness, boredom and lack of involvement 10 . Moreover, our sources show that this was so even in areas with a political record of mass support for Nazism. Erfurt Gestapo reported in April 1935 that very few people attended the indoctrination evenings. The same went for all the rallies and ceremonies, which, in the view of the reporter, aroused absolutely no interest in the public 11 . A study of the opinions of various social classes, taking into account geographical, religious and other variables, shows how widespread such indifference was. Let us look first at the bourgeoisie.
A good deal of material has been preserved about what the Nazis termed (the better circles' - the bourgeoisie and intellectuals. In August 1934, the Trier Gestapo noted a significant drop in the number of better-off people joining the party; the writer added, referring to information he had from other Gestapo stations, that it would appear that this sector of the population was losing interest in political life 12 . While this picture relates to the bourgeoisie of a Catholic region, it is not essentially different from what we know of Schleswig-Holstein, a Protestant district where the Nazi Party had deep roots. A Gestapo Report from Kiel notes the reluctance of the bourgeoisie to participate in rallies or use the 'Heil Hitler' greeting, and their increasing withdrawal from political life 13 . Statistical evidence of this was reported by another Gestapo station in the region: 'the split in the vote in the Luebeck area shows a drop in support for Nazism among the "better circles".' 14
If these attitudes might have been expected among the educated classes, whose initial enthusiasm was dampened by Hitler's methods of repression and brutal terror, the phenomenon is also apparent among a sector of the population generally considered supporters of Nazism: the peasants, especially those of northern and eastern Germany.
From the start, the Nazis spared no energy in winning over the peasants. They promised comprehensive and far-reaching agricultural reforms, and mounted an intensive propaganda campaign aimed at the rural population. With Hitler's rise to power, Walter Darre, the Minister of Agriculture, embarked on a broad program of legislation designed to transform agricultural production - for instance, through the Entailed Farm Law (Erbhofgesetz). In addition, the regime courted the rural public through its Blut und Boden ('blood and soil') doctrine idealising the peasant as the fount of the Nordic race. How effective was this propaganda, and what was the response to it?
Most of the comments on the mood of the rural population speak of political apathy and fatigue. The governor of the Magdeburg district reported that the harvest celebrations in his area in 1934 had attracted little interest: at some ceremonies only the local peasants' leader and a few dozen farmers had turned up 15 . A propaganda campaign in the autumn failed to improve matters, and, according to the governor of the Koblenz district, was responsible for an increase in complaints. In his view, apathy and lack of concern had begun to give way to opposition: (The farming public claims that so long as no significant changes have actually been instituted, despite the party's tales of constant improvements, there is no point in attending its meetings' 16. The same reservations were evident in the Trier Gestapo's report in May 1935. Here an attempt was made to blame seasonal factors for the peasants' absence from parades: (in the summer months the farmer puts in late hours in the fields and he is not interested in meetings after a hard day's work.' It seems, however, that the writer was himself unconvinced by this excuse, for he immediately added that party speeches did not interest the rural audience 17 . Through its monopoly of the media the Third Reich reached the rural public, and demanded its active participation in the Nazi rituals; but people's attitudes were not to be changed so easily. Political indoctrination bored them and, despite the fact that some, particularly the young, stood to benefit from the new system, the bulk of the peasant population continued to have reservations. A major reason for this was the irreconcilable contradiction between the Nazis' promise to establish an agrarian state (part of the romantic-racial myth of Blut und Boden) and the industrialisation, which actually followed.
Another important group that the Nazis tried to win over was the industrial labour force. From its inception the party devoted considerable effort to canvassing workers, especially in the north, but when Hitler acceded to power the workers were not a significant component of the Nazi movement. In order to reach them and make them part of a general consensus in favour of the new system, the regime established (temples' of the Hitler cult in factories; arranged for street-cleaners to be interviewed by the press, to make it appear that they were being taken seriously; and promised various rewards. The climax of the propaganda efforts came on May Day 1933, when the rector of Heidelberg University marched beside a common worker in a festive parade symbolising the realisation of the slogan 'The unity of the workers of the mind and fist' 18 . To what extent were the workers won over by the propaganda campaigns? Some idea of this may be gained from the festivities of May Day, which the regime declared a 'national labour holiday'. The fact was that, as the Nazis recognised, workers were too attached to the traditional celebrations for them to be abolished outright; but, at the same time, efforts were made to give the holiday a new, Nazi content and significance.
Press articles on May Day conjure up a picture of mass participation and spontaneous enthusiasm that would appear to demonstrate the workers' identification with the holiday in its new guise. However, a look at other sources shows that this picture is basically distorted. Most reporters begin by noting the success of the party's propaganda and the high rate of participation in marches. Thus, in its report on the 1935 May Day festivities, the Munster Gestapo claims that the holiday was a great success: that there were public celebrations; that homes were adorned with flags and that people displayed many other signs of loyalty to the regime. Later, however, the report notes that there was a significant decrease in flag-waving in comparison to the previous year. Participation in rallies is declared good, but it is also stated that the rural population and the middle classes tended to keep their involvement to a minimum. Most enlightening are the report's concluding words:
The good participation at parades and rallies cannot serve as a true gauge of the public's real mood and we must not be led astray by what appears on the surface. The public mood has considerably deteriorated in recent weeks, particularly among the local workers. This negative mood has already manifested itself in various ways on Allay Day. According to reports, which have reached me, the workers joined in parades and rallies under duress; at many sites they tried to abscond from the rallies as soon as they had received the beer vouchers, which were distributed. This was particularly noticeable at the Gladbeck Stadium: immediately after the festive entrance they decamped en masse. This shows that some of the workers feel more or less compelled to participate in the rallies while in their hearts they do not exult in them' 19 .
It is patently obvious here that the reality was not always what the regime made it out to be. The above example is, moreover, nothing out of the ordinary: in other localities we find a similar picture, even in the Nazi organisations themselves. Thus, for instance, the Bielefeld Gestapo commented on the May Day celebrations, (Complaints have been received from various areas in the Padeborn district to the effect that the NS-HAGO [Nationalsozialistische Handwerks, Handels und Gewerbe Organisation: Nazi Craft and Commerce Organisation] and the Peasants' Estate did not participate in the May Day festivities to the same extent as last year.' To substantiate this point, the station furnished concrete examples, quoting reports from various police stations 20 . We learn from the Herford police that at many factories nobody showed up, not even the factory leader on behalf of the party and the German Labour Front; and that, among the workers who did appear, there were signs of overt opposition to the regime: 'Some removed the German Labour Front insignia and swastika from their blue caps, and when the parade arrived at the assembly site they retired from it so that they would not be compelled to listen to the Kreisleiter's speech' 21 .
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Berlin Gestapo explicitly stated that mass public participation in the May Day celebrations could not be taken as a measure of the public mood. To underline the point, it enumerated the means used to coerce people to attend rallies 22 .
That public attitudes were vastly different from what they are commonly assumed to have been can be further demonstrated by examining the public responses to mass rallies, for which the party set its mighty conscriptive machinery in motion. At Osnabrueck, for example, the Gestapo reported that a rally addressed by the governor was poorly attended, because, as the writer admitted, the public was tired of parades and meetings 23 . The Aachen Gestapo likewise reported that a party-conference rally for the entire Cologne-Aachen Gnu attracted little support, and that the public in general demonstrated a basic lack of interest in political activity 24 . A study of the public responses to other major campaigns organised by the party leads to similar conclusions regarding the failure of mobilisation. In a community-affairs report for the Hesse-Nassau Gau, for instance, we find a note that the number of marriages in the region has risen surprisingly - in one district by 150 per cent over the previous year 25 . In a comparable report from the Cologne-Aachen Gau, we hear that marriages there have risen among the under twenty-fives, and this time the reporter adds significantly that the development should be viewed as an attempt to evade conscription for work service, to which all unmarried males under this age were liable 26 . This evidence of reluctance to perform work service contrasts with the familiar photographs of happy youngsters marching in ranks to build roads, and is confirmed by Gestapo surveys as well. The Duesseldorf report for September 1934 states that marriage is on the increase in the under-twenty-five age group, and surveys from Bielefeld, Koesslin and elsewhere say the same 27 .
It would seem that, after only one year of Hitler's rule, the willingness of various social groups to take part in the mass-mobilisation campaigns was declining, producing a growing gap between the regime and the populace. This contention can be further substantiated by looking at another tool of indoctrination - the press.
The Limits of the Press as an Instrument of Propaganda
The fluctuations in the circulation of the party press, subservient to Goebbels' propaganda machine, is a partial indicator of the degree to which many Germans responded to Nazi indoctrination. In order to obtain a fuller picture, we must compare the circulation rates of the Nazi press to that of the non-party periodicals published during the first years of the Third Reich. Our main emphasis will be on dailies, weeklies and periodicals which, despite the coercive policy of Gleichschaltung (forcing into line), continued to serve as a sounding-board for the right-wing conservatives and the churches.
In Nazi Germany, as in all totalitarian systems, the press played a vital role as an agent of political socialisation - taking the lead in transmitting and instilling official ideology. When necessary, it churned out propaganda aimed at mobilising the masses and channeling their activities in the interest of the government or the party. It is therefore hardly surprising that surveys of the public mood devoted a special section to the media - press, cinema and radio - keeping the state and party authorities up to date with the effectiveness of these propaganda tools in transmitting the ruling doctrine to the masses. These reports contain an abundance of information on the fate of the various press organs in Germany and the public response to what was printed in them. It stands to reason that this information was invaluable to policy- and decision-makers, helping them assess the influence of the propaganda machine on people's lives, and the degree to which people were susceptible to, or would tolerate, such indoctrination 28 . It is commonly assumed, even by some researchers that with the collapse of the multi-party system the German population became an amorphous and disorganised mass of individuals, devoid of political or social views. People lost all capacity for independent judgement and critical thinking, and submitted to the regime's pressure to conform. This in turn, the view holds, produced total loyalty to the system, and credulous acceptance of the regime's propaganda 29 . A critical look at the Gestapo reports, the district governors' surveys, and other sources concerned with the press and its influence suggests that the reality was quite otherwise.
These sources indicate that, at least during the early years of the Nazi regime, there was still a struggle between the party press and the various church journals. They continued to operate despite pressure from the regime for uniformity, and, for those who knew how to read between the lines, served as an alternative source of information. It would appear, then, that the notion that all Germans underwent a process of social atomisation in the Third Reich is nearer to Nazi propaganda than to historical reality. Public receptiveness to press propaganda reached saturation point soon after Hitler came to power, and thereafter went into decline: it was not long before a trend of outright rejection became manifest. This process can be detected both in the general introductions to the reports and in the survey material on the media. It is also evident in the statistical data furnished by the summaries, which point to a steady decline in the circulation of party journals. This was undoubtedly part of the reaction noted earlier, that set in after the first year of Nazi rule, when the new system's inability to fulfil all its promises became apparent.
From the beginning of summer 1934 one finds neither the 'disappearance of faith in the ordinary reality, the pull towards indoctrination', nor 'the cancellation of independent views in the face of official propaganda' 30 , but rather the reverse: a gradual widening of the credibility gap between the regime and those segments of the public which refused to bow to the tide of propaganda. Various commentators tell of critical responses among readers, and lack of confidence in the information published in the press. Thus the president of the Rhine province wrote in his report for September-October 1934, 'The little information that has been transmitted to the public has proved harmful, rumours are ever rampant. The press and radio are not considered reliable and two public opinion systems are developing: the one represented by the press and on the radio, and the one known as the "rumour press" which spreads quickly' 31 . Equally illustrative of this state of affairs is the report by the Aachen Gestapo covering the same period. Among other things it states that, in response to articles praising the changes and improvements initiated in the country since the inception of the Third Reich, people say that about 50 per cent of what is written distorts the truth and should be discounted 32 . This report, of course, came from a Catholic region with a more liberal tradition than in some parts of the Reich, but reports from other regions tell a similar story. The same September the president of Westphalia said that people no longer believed what was written in the press 33 , and during the autumn and winter the credibility gap widened all over the country.
References:
1. For a similar reality in other totalitarian regimes see A. P. L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China (University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif., 1975), pp. 111ΓÇô12; A. Inkeles and R. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen. Daily life in a totalitarian society (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp. 172ΓÇô3; G. H. Hollander, Soviet Political Indoctrination. Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda since Stalin (Praeger, New York, 1972), pp. 163ff.
2. RP Niederbayern und Oberpfalz, report Apr. 1934, BHStA, MA 106676.
3. RP Aachen, report Sep. 1934, BA, R 18/1555; Vollmer, Volksopposition , p. 104.
4. Gestapo Duesseldorf, report October 1934, GStA, REP/90P.
5. Gestapo Muenster, report June 1935, ibid.
6. Gestapo Aachen, report July 1935, BA, R 58/662; Vollmer, Volksopposition , p. 255.
7. Documents on German Foreign Policy (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1957), series C., vol. I, p. 114. See also K. D. Bracher, M. Sauer and G. Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Westdeutscher Verlag, Cologne, 1960), p. 906, n. 34.
8. Gestapo Hannover, report Feb. 1935, BA, R 58/1128; Gestapo Muenster, report June 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; RP Koenigsberg, report Aug. 1934, BA, R 58/1563.
9. RP Minden, report Aug. 1935, BA, R 18/1566.
10. Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power , pp. 241ΓÇô67.
11.Gestapo Erfurt, report Apr. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; OP Koenigsberg, report Aug. 1934, BA, R 58/1563.
12.Gestapo Trier, report Aug. 1934, GStA, REP/90 P.
13.Gestapo Kiel, report May 1935, BA R 58/480.
14.Gestapo Luebeck, report Aug. 1934, GStA, REP/90 P.
15.RP Magdeburg, report Sep. 1934, YVA, JM/2834.
16.RP Koblenz, report Nov. 1934, BA, R 18/1564. Cf. RP Wiesbaden, report Oct. 1935, YVA, JM/2834; RP Minden, report Aug. 1935, BA, R 18/1566.
17.Gestapo Trier, report May 1935, BA, R 58/510.
18.On the Hitler cult see D. Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution (Anchor, New York, 1967), pp. 73ff.
19.Gestapo Muenster, report May 1935, BA, R 58/510.
20.Gestapo Bi, report May 1935, YVA, JM/2834.
21.RP Oppeln, report Apr.ΓÇôMay 1935, GStA, REP/90 P.
22.Gestapo Berlin, report May 1935, BA, R 58/436. At the same time the Gestapo stations at Duesseldorf, Muenster and Osnabrueck reported that participation in the elections for workers councils was expeto be poor, owing to the critical mood among workers. Similar problems were experienced at other times: for example, the Gestapo at Braunschweig reported that in May 1938 (BA, R 58/449) most of workers gathered for rally left the assembly place, and only with difficulties were a third of them reassembled.
23.RP Osnabrueck, report Aug. 1934, BA, R 18/1569.
27.Gestapo Duesseldorf, report Sep. 1934, GStA, REP/90 P; RP Minden, report Oct. 1934, BA, R 18/1566; Gestapo Koeslin, report July 1935, GStA, REP/90 P.
28.In the analysis of this theme I found the newspaper collection of Borge Maciejewsky (YVA, JM/3454 1ΓÇô105) most helpful. It comprises eighty volumes of newspapers covering the years 1921ΓÇô45. From the large body of literature dealing with the press and its impact see esp. J. Hagemann, Die Presselenkung im Dritten Reich (Bouvier, Bonn, 1970); F. Saenger, Politik der Taeuschungen. Missbrauch der Presse im Dritten Reich, Weisungen, Informationen, Notizen, 1933ΓÇô1939 (Europa, Vienna, 1975); Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (Oxford University Press, London, 1973); W. A. Boelcke, Wollt ihr den totalen Krieg?' Die geheimen Goebbels Konferenzen 1939ΓÇô1943 (DVA, Stuttgart, 1967); H. Bohrmann and G. Toepser Ziegert (eds.), NS Presseanweisungen der Vorkriegszeit (Saur, Munich, 1985ΓÇô7).
29.Hagemann, Presselenkung , p. 201, a view shared by H. Storek, Dirigierte Oeffentlichkeit. Die Zeitung als Herrschaftsmittel in den Anfangsjahren der nationalsozialistischen Regierung (Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1972). On the limitations of the media in other totalitarian regimes see W. Pye (ed.), Communication and Political Development (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1963); N. Wessel, The Credibility, Impact and Effectiveness of the Soviet Non-Specialised Newspaper' (PhD Dissertation, University of California, 1972), pp. 166ff.; Hollander, Soviet Political Indoctrination , pp. 59ff.; A. Buzek, How the Communist Press Works (Pall Mall, London, 1964).
30.Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism , p. 351.
31.OP Rheinprovinz, report Nov. 1934, BA, R 18/1563.
32.Gestapo Aachen, report Aug. 1934, BA, R 58/660; Vollmer, Volksopposition , p. 79.
33.OP Westfalen , report Sep. 1934, GStA, REP/90 P; Gestapo Koeln, report January 1935, BA, R 58/681; Gestapo Aachen, report May 1934, BA, R 18/568.
